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Intergenerational Analysis of the 
Donating Behaviour of Parents and their Offspring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Using data drawn from the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we explore the relationship 
between the donating behaviour of parents and that of their children aged less than 18 which gives a direct 
insight into whether an intergenerational relationship in donating behaviour exists. Furthermore, we exploit 
information relating to whether or not parents encourage their children to donate to charity by talking to them 
about donating in order to unveil information related to the intergenerational transmission of philanthropic 
behaviour. Our findings suggest that an intergenerational correlation is only present in the absence of a control 
for whether the parent talks to the child about donating. The effect from the parent talking to their offspring is 
associated with an increased likelihood that the child donates by approximately 10 percentage points, a finding 
which is robust to a number of different estimation strategies. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
Philanthropic behaviour has attracted considerable attention in the economics literature, with 
theoretical contributions focusing on explaining why some individuals and households give 
away a portion of their income, whilst empirical contributions have focused on identifying 
the determinants of donating behaviour. Such interest in this particular facet of individual and 
household behaviour is not surprising given that recent figures from Giving U.S.A. 2012 
estimate total charitable contributions in the U.S. in 2011 at $298.42 billion.1 
Over the last four decades, one strand of the empirical literature on the economics of 
charity has focused on analysis of the decision to donate at the individual or household level, 
with particular attention paid to the impact of tax deductibility and the corresponding price 
and income effects. The empirical analysis of charitable donations has benefited from both 
methodological advances with respect to econometric techniques as well as the increased 
availability and quality of individual and household level data. Andreoni (2006) provides a 
comprehensive survey of the influences on charitable donations established in the existing 
economics literature, with economic factors such as income as well as demographic 
characteristics playing important roles in explaining patterns of donating behaviour observed 
at the individual and household levels.2 
One area, which has attracted less interest in the existing empirical literature in 
economics, concerns the relationship between the donating behaviour of parents and their 
offspring. Conversely, there is a growing related empirical literature in economics exploring 
intergenerational relationships related to attitudes and behaviours such as trust, risk attitudes 
and sociability. For example, Guiso et al. (2008) model the intergenerational transmission of 
priors about the trustworthiness of others within an overlapping generations framework, 
                                                 
1
 The figure relates to total charitable contributions from U.S. individuals, corporations and foundations and 
includes both cash and in-kind donations. 73% of this figure ($217.79) stems from individual donations. 
2
 See Bekkers and Wiepking (2011, 2012) for comprehensive surveys of the influences on charitable donations 
from a range of disciplines.  
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whilst Dohmen et al. (2012) explore the intergenerational transmission of trust and risk 
attitudes using the German Socio-Economic Panel. Finally, using data drawn from the U.S. 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, Okumura and Usui (2010) explore the effect of 
SDUHQWV¶VRFLDOVNLOOVRQWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VVRFLDELOLW\7KXV WKHLQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDO WUDQVPLVsion 
of a wide range of skills, economic outcomes and attitudes has been the subject of much 
theoretical and empirical scrutiny in the economics literature. 
In contrast, the intergenerational relationship between the donating behaviour of 
parents and their offspring remains relatively unexplored from an empirical perspective in the 
economics literature, which may reflect the shortage of data in this area. One interesting 
exception is Wilhelm et al. (2008), who estimate the correlation between the generosity of 
parents and that of their adult children using data drawn from the U.S. Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The findings, which are based on a wide array of econometric techniques 
and specification tests, indicate a strong positive correlation between the religious donations 
of parents and their adult children, a correlation in the same order of magnitude as that for 
intergenerational relationships with respect to income and wealth. For secular giving, a 
positive correlation remains, albeit, smaller in magnitude.  
Becker (1993) argues that children are heavily influenced by the attitudes and 
behaviour of their parents, with childhood experiences during the formative early years 
VHUYLQJ WR VKDSH LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SUHIHUHQFHV Hence, empirical investigation into whether an 
intergenerational relationship exists between parental donations and that of their offspring 
pre-adulthood would seem warranted. For example, parents, who wish to instil in their 
offspring altruistic attitudes and encourage philanthropic behaviour, may display altruistic 
behaviour themselves in order to serve as role models. Evidence from the social psychology 
literature based on controlled laboratory experiments cited by Cox and Stark (1996) indicates 
WKDW FKLOGUHQ¶s pro-social behaviour increases with the pro-social behaviour of their role 
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models. Such contributions highlight the important role of social learning, which has attracted 
considerable attention in the social psychology literature, whereby children learn to behave in 
a pro-social manner by imitating models behaving pro-socially (Lévy-Garboua et al., 2006).3 
Similarly, findings from the child psychology literature suggest that role-modelling plays an 
important role in developing this type of pro-social altruistic behaviour in young children 
(see, for example, Grusec, 1991, for a review of the psychology literature on the socialisation 
of altruism in young children). 
In the context of analysing the extent to which parents aim to inculcate in their 
children FHUWDLQ DWWLWXGHV &R[ DQG 6WDUN   H[SORUH WKH µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ HIIHFW¶
ZKHUHE\ SDUHQWV WHDFK WKHLU FKLOGUHQ WKH µGHVLUHG¶ IXWXUH EHKDYLRXU E\ VHWWLQJ DQ H[DPSOH
themselves. They focus on preference shaping in the context of facilitating intergenerational 
exchange in the provision of care, where parents take care of their own parents in order to 
elicit future care from their children. They present empirical evidence consistent with the 
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ HIIHFW¶ 6FKRNNDHUW  FRPPHQWV WKDW WKHLU Wheoretical model provides 
LQVLJKW LQWRWKHµIRUPDWLRQRIGXWLIXODOWUXLVWV¶4 Clearly, for such preference shaping to take 
place, the children must be young enough to respond to such modelling. Similarly, Ribar and 
Wilhelm (2006) report results in accordance with a role model explanation for the 
transmission of attitudes relating to intergenerational assistance. In the context of 
volunteering, Bekkers (2007) reports evidence based on Dutch survey data supporting a 
positive relationship between volunteering and parental volunteering. For example, parental 
volunteering for quasi-UHOLJLRXVDVVRFLDWLRQVLVIRXQGWRLQFUHDVHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIFKLOGUHQ¶V
                                                 
3
 Recent evidence by de Oliveira et al. (2012) demonstrates that choices in a laboratory public goods game 
predict giving in real donation experiments, as well as self-reported donations and volunteering outside of the 
laboratory, suggesting that evidence from such laboratory experiments provide valuable predictions for 
behaviour in different settings. 
4
 In a similar vein, Bisin and Verdier (2001) analyse the dynamics of preference traits in the context of 
intergenerational cultural transmission.  
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volunteering for secular associations, controlling for key characteristics such as religion, 
education, wealth and personality. 
We contribute to the empirical literature on altruistic behaviour by exploring the 
relationship between the donating behaviour of parents and that of their children aged less 
than 18 years, i.e. pre-adulthood. Our focus on younger individuals reflects the importance of 
parental influence and guidance during this formative stage of the life cycle. Furthermore, we 
exploit information relating to whether or not parents encourage their children to donate to 
charity in order to ascertain how suFKµGLUHFWLYHV¶LQIOXHQFHWKHLQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLS
between parents and their offspring. In terms of non-disciplinary verbalisations, with 
reference to the psychology literature, Lévy-Garboua et al. (2006), p.564, comment that 
µGLUHFWLYHV DUH JHQHUDOO\ HIIHFWLYH DQG RIWHQ ODVW¶ +HQFH RXU HPSLULFDO DQDO\VLV VHUYHV WR
shed some light on the transmission of philanthropic behaviour in the context of exploring the 
effects of such direct parental verbalisations in addition to establishing the existence of 
intergenerational correlations in such behaviour.  
Our findings suggest that whether a child donates to charity is influenced by positive 
effects from whether the parent donates to charity. However, this intergenerational 
correlation disappears once we control for whether the parent talks to their child about 
donating to charity. This finding is robust to a number of alternative estimation strategies and 
suggests that such parental verbalisations are what matter LQ VKDSLQJ D FKLOG¶V DOWUXLVWLF
behaviour.  
2. Data and Methodology 
We use data drawn from the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which is a panel 
of individuals on-going since 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 
individuals living in 5,000 families in the United States. The survey is conducted by the 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. The PSID took place annually from 
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1968 to 1996 and then biennially from 1997 through to 2011, the latest survey year. In 1997, 
the PSID added an additional component, the Child Development Supplement (CDS), which 
is a study of children (aged 0-12 in 1997) in a sub-sample of PSID families. Completed 
interviews were obtained with 2,394 families (88% of target), providing information on 3,563 
children. The CDS was undertaken again in 2002 and 2007 (when children were aged 10-19), 
where for the latter 1,506 children were successfully re-interviewed (90% of target), and is a 
nationally representative and longitudinal database of children. The CDS contains additional 
information relating to parents in the PSID and their children, with the objective being to 
provide information on early human capital formation. In cases where there were more than 
two eligible children in the family, two were randomly selected to take part in the CDS.  
With regards to the structure of the interviews in the PSID-CDS for those households 
with a child, an interviewer visits the household and obtains written permission to interview 
the child(ren) from the primary caregiver. Firstly, in the CDS, the child(ren) is (are) 
interviewed in person using computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), including an 
Audio Computer-Assisted Self-Interview (ACASI) component for sensitive topics asked of 
adolescents, e.g. psychological control. Second, the aGROHVFHQW¶VSULPDU\FDUHJLYHUW\SLFDOO\
the mother) is interviewed either in person or via a computer assisted telephone interview 
(CATI) based on their preference. Finally, either the primary caregiver or their spouse is 
interviewed in the PSID¶VFRUHPDin family interview.  
We focus on data from the 2002 and 2007 CDS, matching the information in the CDS 
with that available in the main head of family PSID questionnaires for 2001 and 2007,5 which 
include a series of detailed questions relating to giving to charity. Our matched sample of 
children and their parents comprises 2,366 child-adult pairs observed either once or twice in 
the data yielding 3,105 observations, where the children are aged between 8 and 17 years.  
                                                 
5
 We match the 2002 CDS to the 2001 PSID since there is no 2002 PSID given that the survey is biennial post 
1996. Furthermore, in 2002, the CDS re-contacted families in CDS-I (i.e. 1997) who remained active in the 
PSID panel as of 2001. Hence, arguably it makes more sense to match to the 2001 PSID rather than to 2003.  
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For those households with children, in the 2002 and 2007 CDS, the child was asked: 
Did you give some of your money last year - if only a few pennies - to a church, synagogue, 
or another charity that helps people who are not part of your family? The responses to this 
question, which provide information on the donating behaviour of children, were used to 
create a binary indicator, CY , which takes the value of one if the child makes such donations. 
The primary caregiver was then asked: Do you ever talk to your child about giving some of 
(his/her) money - if only a few pennies - to a church, synagogue, or another charity? The 
responses to this question in the CDS potentially unveil information related to how charitable 
behaviour is transmitted across generations. We use such responses to create a binary 
indicator, T , which takes the value of one if the parent talks to the child about such 
donations.  
In the core PSID, households are asked about total donations to charity over the 
respective calendar years SURYLGLQJ GHWDLOHG LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH SDUHQW¶V GRQDWLQJ
behaviour.6 The responses to this set of questions are used to create a binary indicator of 
whether the parent donates to charity, PY .
7
 The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), 
which provides data on giving and volunteering by families, is the generosity module in the 
core PSID.8 
The matched child-parent data reveals that, on average, over the two years, 72% of 
children report that they donate to charity compared to 60% of parents, whilst 70% of parents 
                                                 
6
 The information on giving data has been shown to be nationally representative, see Wilhelm (2006).  
7
 The definition of a charitable organization in the PSID LQFOXGHVµUHOLJLRXVRUQRQ-profit organizations that help 
WKRVH LQ QHHG RU WKDW VHUYH DQG VXSSRUW WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ ,W LV FOHDUO\ VWDWHG LQ WKH TXHVWLRQQDLUH WKDW WKH
definition used does not include political contributions. The information about adult (parent) charitable 
donations available in the 2001 and 2007 PSID is related to activity in calendar years 2000 and 2006, implying 
that these variables describe role-modelling one year (or more) prior to the measurement of FKLOGUHQ¶VGRQDWLQJ
in the CDS. Information on the primary caregiver talking to their child about donating comes from the CDS and 
KHQFHLVFRQFXUUHQWZLWKWKHPHDVXUHPHQWRIFKLOGUHQ¶VGRQDWLQJEHKDYLRXU8QIRUWXQDWHO\WKHVXUYH\TXestions 
HOLFLWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW FKLOGUHQ¶V GRQDWLQJ EHKDYLRXU GLIIHU IURP WKRVH HOLFLWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ UHODWLQJ WR
parental donating behaviour. Full details on the PSID and CDS documentation are available at: 
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/documents.aspx. 
8
 See http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/research-by-category/center-on-philanthropy-panel-study. 
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report that they talk to their child about donating to charity. In the matched sample, 45% of 
the observations are characterised by the parent and the child both donating to charity, with 
only 13% reporting that neither the parent nor the child donates to charity. Interestingly, 27% 
of observations are characterised by the child reporting that they donate to charity, whilst the 
parent indicates that they do not donate to charity compared to only 15% where the parent 
reports that they donate to charity and the child reports that they do not donate to charity. The 
data also reveals that in the case where the parent talks to the child about donating to charity, 
77% of children report that they donate to charity. 
 We explore the intergenerational transmission of altruistic behaviour by considering 
the influence of parental donating behaviour on the probability that their offspring donates to 
charity. Defining *CY  as the propensity to donate by the child, estimating the following 
univariate probit model provides a direct test of the intergenerational effect where parental 
donating PY  is initially treated as an exogenous variable: 
*
C C PY ' YE J H  X           (1) 
For example, if the estimate of J is positive this would suggest that the children of parents 
who donate are more likely to donate. We then consider whether the likelihood that the child 
donates to charity is influenced by their parent talking to them about donating, initially 
treating this as an exogenous variable, which is captured by the 0O  coefficient in equation 2: 
 0 0 0 0 0*C C P PY Ȗ < Ȝ 7 < 7 İE Ic    u X        (2) 
In addition, the interaction term in equation (2) serves to shed light on how the association 
EHWZHHQ FKLOGUHQ¶V DQG SDUHQWDO GRQDWLRQ EHKDYLRXU LV LQIOXHQFHG E\ D GLUHFW DWWHPSW E\
parents to impart these attitudes to children by talking to them about donating. Hence, the 
additional term serves to indicate whether such deliberate direct attempts to influence 
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behaviour strengthens the intergenerational correlation in donating behaviour, which would 
be supported empirically if 0 0I ! .  
It is unlikely that parental donating, PY , and talking to the child about donating, T , 
are exogenous and, so to take this into account, we model the donating behaviour of children 
via a system of three equations which captures WKH SDUHQW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR GRQDWH WR FKDULW\ 
(equation 3a below), whether the parent talks to the child about donating (equation 3b below), 
and whether the child donates to charity (equation 3c below). The key advantage of 
estimating a system of equations is that it allows us to account for the correlation via 
unobservable individual or household characteristics that may affect the three decisions. 
Thus, oXUV\VWHPIUDPHZRUNDOORZVIRU WKHHQGRJHQHLW\RI WKHSDUHQW¶VGRQDWLQJEHKDYLRXU 
and whether they talk to their offspring about making charitable donations. We specify a 
system of three latent equations as follows: 
*
P P P1 P1;Y 'E H X
   
                 (3a) 
*
T T1 T1;T 'E H X
   
                 (3b) 
 *C C C1 1 P1 1 1 P C1Y ' Y T Y TE J O I H    u X ;                 (3c)
 
where *PY  and *CY  represent the propensity to donate by the parent and the child, respectively, 
and *T  is the propensity of the parent to talk to the child about donating. Assume that the 
error terms in the three latent equations are independently and identically distributed and 
jointly follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix ¦ . That 
is, > @P1 T1 C1( , , ) ' ~ 0,MVNH H H ¦  where the covariance matrix is given by:
 
 
PT PC
PT TC
PC TC
1
1 ,
1
U U
U U
U U
§ ·¨ ¸¦  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
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jkU  being the correlation coefficient between jH  and kH   , P,T,C;j k j k z  and 
     P T Cvar var var 1H H H    for identification purposes. Under this assumption, the set of 
equations given by (3a, b and c) above results in an endogenous Multivariate Probit (MVP) 
model with a recursive simultaneous structure. Identification is ensured through exclusion 
restrictions and a highly non-linear specification. For instance, PX  and TX  contain separate 
instruments that do not appear in CX , as detailed below. The MVP specification with 
potentially non-zero off-diagonal elements in ¦  allows for correlations across the 
disturbances of the three latent equations which embody unobserved characteristics. The 
system of equations allows for the estimation of several joint and conditional probabilities, 
such as, > @P CProb 1, 1, 1Y T Y   , > @PProb 0 | 1T Y   and > @C PProb 1| 1, 0Y Y T   .  
We also explore the effect of the amount of parental donations by estimating the 
monetary amount donated by the family in equation (4a) simultaneously with, whether the 
parent talks to the child about donating (equation 4b below), and the probability that the child 
donates, equation (4c). The natural logarithm of the dollar amount donated in 2001 prices is 
given by  Plog D . The average donation by parents is $4,744 (4.5 in log levels) with 40% 
not making a charitable donation.9 This system framework allows for the endogeneity of both 
the amount that the parent donates and whether they talk to their offspring about making 
charitable donations. We specify a system of three equations, with one censored dependent 
variable and two latent dependent variables, as follows: 
 p P P2 P2log ;D 'E H X
  
                 (4a) 
*
T T2 T2;T 'E H X
   
                 (4b) 
   ^ `*C C C2 2 p 2 2 P C2log logY ' D T D TE J O I H    u X ;               (4c)
 
                                                 
9
 Given there is clustering at zero, in order to convert to natural logarithms we add one to the level of donations. 
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In the psychology literature, results from laboratory experiments have indicated that the more 
generous a role model is (in our application, the parent in terms of the level of their donation) 
the larger is the effect that they have (Lévy-Garboua et al., 2006). Thus, we explore whether 
the effect of parental donating behaviour on the probability that the child donates is 
increasing in the amount that the parent gives to charity. Given that the dependent variable in 
equation (4a) is now a censored variable, i.e. some parents do not donate to charity so there is 
clustering at zero, and the dependent variables in equations (4b) and (4c) are probabilities, the 
model is estimated simultaneously by a conditional (recursive) mixed process estimator in 
STATA 12 using the CMP command, see Roodman (2009).10  
We also estimate treatment effects of the endogenous variables in both systems, i.e. in 
terms of equations (3a) to (3c), the impact of whether the parent donates on whether the child 
donates to charity and the impact of whether the parent talks to the child about donating to 
charity on whether the child donates to charity. Three widely used measures of treatment 
effects are ones that average over all individuals (ATE), ones that average over only the 
treated (ATET) and ones that average over only the untreated (ATEUT). For instance, 
focusing upon equations (3a) to (3c), the three measures of the treatment effects of PY  on 
> @CProb 1Y  , where the likelihood of the child donating is also conditioned upon the parent 
talking to them about making charitable donations, can be obtained as follows: 
^ `  1 0C C C C C1 1 1 1 C C1 1; ,ATE = E Y Y T ' T T ' TE O J I E Oª º  )    ) ¬ ¼X X X     (5) 
  
 
  
 
1 0
C C P P C
2 P P1 C C1 1 1 1 PC 2 P P1 C C1 1 PC
P P1 P P1
| 1, , ,
, ; , ;
ATET = E Y Y Y T =
T T TE E O J I U E E O U
E E
ª º  ¬ ¼
­ ½ ­ ½c c c c)    ) ° ° ° °® ¾ ® ¾c c) )° ° ° °¯ ¿ ¯ ¿
X X
X X X X
X X
  (6) 
                                                 
10
 Unfortunately, information relating to how much the child donates is not available in the CDS. 
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1 0
C C P P C
2 P P1 C C1 1 1 1 2 P P1 C C1 1
P P1 P P1
[ | 0, , , ]
( ( ), ( ; ( ( ), ( ;
( ( )) ( ( ))
PC PC
ATEUT E Y Y Y T
Ȝ7 Ȗ 7 Ȝ7E E I U E E U
E E
    
­ ½ ­ ½c c c c)      )   ° ° ° °® ¾ ® ¾c c)  ) ° ° ° °¯ ¿ ¯ ¿
X X
X X X X
X X
     (7) 
where 1CY  and 0CY  denote the respective values of CY  when PY  takes values 1 and 0, and )  
and 2)  denote the univariate normal cumulative density function and the bivariate normal 
cumulative density function, respectively. Similarly, three measures of the treatment effects 
of T  on > @CProb 1Y  , where the likelihood of the child donating is also conditioned upon 
whether the parent makes a charitable donation can be obtained. Furthermore, a set of 
corresponding ATEs can be calculated for the system shown in equations (4a) to (4c).  
In both of the systems of equations, the computation of marginal effects in these 
models is fairly complex given the endogenous structure of the model and the presence of 
common variables across the three equations. We therefore estimate them via numerical 
derivatives of the multivariate normal distribution functions with respect to the exogenous 
variables. In addition, we can obtain marginal effects not only on marginal probabilities but 
also on joint and conditional probabilities. Treatment effects are also calculated using 
numerical gradients given they are highly non-linear functions of X and analytical solutions 
are difficult to obtain. The corresponding standard errors are computed using the delta 
method.11 Consider the trivariate binary model shown in equations (3a) to (3c). Take the 
variable, *X , which appears in all three equations. If we were to compute the marginal effect 
of *X  on CY , this would comprise of a direct effect of 
*X  on > @CProb 1Y   and indirect 
effects through Prob ]1[  T  and Prob P[ 1]Y   given that T  and PY  enter equation (3c), see 
Greene (2012). Similarly, direct and indirect effects occur when estimating equations (4a) to 
(4c). 
                                                 
11
 Marginal effects, treatment effects and standard errors are estimated using GAUSS 12. 
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 We explore whether parent and child donating behaviour are correlated after 
controlling for a range of characteristics (such as income, wealth, health and religion) that are 
expected to influence such intergenerational relationships. As argued by Bekkers (2007), 
RPLWWLQJ VXFK FRQWUROV PD\ OHDG WR VSXULRXV FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ SDUHQWDO DQG FKLOGUHQ¶V
behaviour, based on biased empirical results. In terms of the explanatory variables, common 
covariates in both PX  and TX , are controls for the following head of household 
characteristics: age; gender; ethnicity; years of schooling; health status specifically whether 
in good/very good health, or whether in excellent health (where poor or very poor health 
forms the reference category); and religious denomination of the family, whether catholic, 
protestant, or any other religious group (where no religion forms the reference category). We 
also control for household labour income, household non-labour income, household wealth 
and whether the home is owned, either outright or via a mortgage. Following the existing 
literature, we control for the price of donating to charity, which is determined by taxation as 
income donated to recognised charities in the U.S. is not subject to income tax. Hence, 
disposable income falls by less than the full amount donated: the price of the donation 
becomes the donation net of the saving in tax since each dollar donated to a recognised 
charity leads to less than one dollar sacrificed for consumption purposes (Auten et al., 2002). 
For households who itemise charitable donations in their tax return, the price of the donation 
LVGHILQHGDVRQHPLQXVWKHKRXVHKROG¶VPDUJLQDOWD[UDWHRQWKHFRQWULEXWLRQPDGHZKHUHDV
for households who do not itemise charitable donations, the price of the donation is one: 
donating one dollar means that there is one dollar less for consumption. Households who 
itemise are assigned the relevant tax rate using the National Bureau of Economic Research 
14 
 
TAXSIM programme,12 which calculates federal state tax liabilities for survey data based on 
a range of factors such as earnings, marital status and children.13  
As the components of the model are nonlinear, the system is uniquely identified due 
to these nonlinearities, Greene (2012). However, it is preferable to identify the three 
equations on the basis of explicit exclusion restrictions and, hence, this is the approach we 
take (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2010). In PX , equations (3a) and (4a), we include the 
following set of instruments. Firstly, the proportion of households donating by state for age 
specific (18+) reference groups matched to parents by state and age. This is generated from 
the main PSID sample rather than the matched parent-offspring sub-sample. We conjecture 
that this will influence parental donations for those who are in the same social reference 
space, see Andreoni and Scholz (1998), i.e. state-age group. However, the donating decision 
of the child is likely to be independent of this since a different reference group is arguably 
applicable, i.e. 8-17 years olds. Secondly, we also use a binary indicator for whether the 
household has itemised for medical expenses in the previous year. The logic here is that tax 
deduction is an incentive to make donations, see Vesterlund (2006). Hence, the itemisation 
status for items other than charitable donations, e.g. medical expenses, may act as proxy for 
awareness of tax advantages, which might, therefore, be an appropriate predictor for 
donations. In TX , equations (3b) and (4b), we include a set of binary instruments 
specifically: whether the parent discusses what their child studies in school on a daily basis; 
and whether the parent talks to the child on a daily basis about current events like things 
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 See http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/. 
13
 One remaining issue, however, is that the decision to itemise is arguably not fully exogenous, i.e. the decision 
to itemise may be influenced by the level of donations. To account for this, as is common in the existing 
literature (see Auten et al.  ZH H[FOXGH µHQGRJHQRXV LWHPLVHUV¶ ZKo are defined as those who have 
itemised but would not have done so in the absence of their actual charitable donations. Due to an additional 
source of possible endogeneity relating to the price of a charitable donation being a function of both the 
donation and income, following Auten et al. (2002), we calculate the price variable firstly by assuming that 
charitable donations equal zero (i.e. the first dollar price) and then after including a predicted amount of giving, 
set at 1% of average income. As stated by Auten et al. SµWKLVSURFHGXUH\LHOGVDWD[SULFHFRQVLVWHQW
with the actual costs of giving, but not endogenous to the LQGLYLGXDOGRQDWLRQGHFLVLRQ¶)ROORZLQJWKHH[LVWLQJ
literature, we then take an average of the two price variables. 
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going on in the news. The idea here is that talking to children about their studies and/or 
events in the media is likely to be associated with the parent talking to the child about making 
donations to charity, but arguably have no direct influence on the probability that the child 
donates per se. We also use a binary indicator for whether the child eats with the family on a 
daily basis as an instrument as it seems likely that children who regularly eat with their 
parents will have a higher propensity to discuss issues, e.g. donating, yet this is not likely to 
directly influence the decision of the child to undertake a charitable donation.14 
In CX , we include controls for a range of child characteristics and family level 
covariates. The following child characteristics are used in the model: gender; ethnicity; age; 
whether the child has one sibling, or two or more siblings in the household (no siblings as the 
reference category); health status, specifically whether in good/very good health, or whether 
in excellent health (where poor or very poor health forms the reference category); the number 
of friends that the child has; the amount of the allowance/pocket money received by the child; 
whether the child was involved in any volunteer service activities or service clubs in the past 
12 months; and a proxy for ability from performance in a reading test, passage 
comprehension test, and an applied problems test.15 Finally, we attempt to control for aspects 
RI WKHFKLOG¶VEHKDYLRXUE\FRPELQLQJDQXPEHURIYDULDEOHV WKURXJK IDFWRUDQDO\VLV LQWRD
single measure.16 ,Q WHUPV RI KRXVHKROG FRQWUROV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH FKLOG¶V GRQDWLQJ HTXDWLRQ, 
we incorporate the price of donating, household income, wealth, family housing tenure and 
                                                 
14
 The validity of the instruments is discussed in the following section. 
15
 Each test is the age-standardized score in the Woodcock-Johnson Revised Achievement Tests, which are 
widely used and have been validated extensively (see Woodcock and Johnson, 1990, for further details of the 
tests).  
16
 The underlying variables used in the factor analysis are whether the parent states that the child does each of 
the following, without adult encouragement, most days or everyday: helps siblings; is kind towards siblings; 
cooperated with siblings; takes turns with play materials with siblings; or listens to siblings. Also whether the 
child has given emotional support to their friends over the last 6 months; whether the child has helped friends 
with things they had to get done, such as homework or chores, a few times a week or more over the last six 
months; and whether the child has helped parents with things they had to get done, such as chores or running 
errands, a few times a week or more over the last six months. Note that factor analysis rather than principal 
components is used due to the variables being measured on different scales. The variables are standardised prior 
to the factor analysis. 
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the religious denomination of the family, where these variables are defined as above. 
Summary statistics for all of the explanatory variables employed in our empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 1 in the appendix.17 In equations (3a, 3b) and (4a, 4b), all covariates in 
CX  are included in the regressors, i.e. C P T{ , }X X X , in order to gain increased efficiency 
in the estimates (Wooldridge 2010). 
3. Results 
Initially we focus on the results of estimating the univariate models of equations (1) and (2) 
which consider the determinants of the probability that the child donates. As discussed above 
this treats both whether the parent donates (amount of the donation) and whether the parent 
talks to the child about charitable donations as exogenous variables. Hence, we then consider 
the potential problem of endogeneity and whether this influences our findings by employing 
the multivariate frameworks given by equations (3a-3c) and (4a-4c). 
Univariate Analysis 
The results from estimating the univariate models of equations (1) and (2) are shown in Table 
2 with marginal effects reported. There are four specifications shown. Columns 1 and 2 are 
based on estimating equations (1) and (2) conditional upon whether the parent donates to 
charity, whereas columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis but are based on the amount that the 
parent donates. The probability that the child donates is inversely related to, for example, the 
child being male, which is consistent with the findings of Wilhelm et al. (2011), and the non 
labour income of the household.18 Positive effects on the likelihood that the child donates are 
found from whether the child volunteers; the passage comprehension test score; and whether 
the family religious denomination is protestant relative to no religion. Turning to the effect of 
parental donating behaviour, the results in both columns 1 and 3 reveal that the likelihood 
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 It is important to acknowledge that some of the covariates may potentially be endogenous such as pocket 
money or volunteering, which may lead to bias in the results. We find, however, that omitting such potentially 
endogenous variables from the model does not influence the results relating to our key parameters of interest. 
18
 Non labour income includes benefit income for unemployment compensation and child support plus all other 
sources of transfer income received by the head and spouse. 
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that the child donates to charity is positively related to the parent donating and also to the 
amount donated. To be specific, if the parent donates then the probability that the child 
donates to charity increases by 5.2 percentage points. Or, if the parent increases the amount 
donated by 1% the probability that the child donates to charity increases by 1 percentage 
point. Hence, there is some evidence of an intergenerational effect in donating behaviour 
when parental donating behaviour is treated as exogenous. However, this effect becomes 
statistically insignificant once whether the parent talks to the child about donating is entered 
into the model, see columns 2 and 4. In particular, whether the parent talks to the child about 
donating is associated with around 10 percentage points higher probability that the child 
donates. 
There is some evidence in the existing literature to suggest differential effects of 
SDUHQWDO UROH PRGHOOLQJ XSRQ FKLOGUHQ¶V DOWUXLVWLF EHKDYLRXU )RU H[DPSOH 6WXNDV HW DO
(1999) found that parental role modelling had a larger impact on the self-image of young 
females and argued WKDW WKLVVXEVHTXHQWO\PLJKW LPSO\DVWURQJHUHIIHFWRQJLUOV¶SUR-social 
behaviour. This is consistent with the reasoning put forward by Eisenberg et al. (2006) where 
a higher level of moral reasoning is sometimes exhibited by girls. Consequently, girls might 
be more responsive to parental role modelling whilst boys have to be encouraged verbally to 
donate. Similarly, there may be differential effects of parental role modelling and 
verbalisation by race. Often giving and volunteering are considered to be closely related pro-
social behaviour, see, for example, Wilhelm et al. (2011), and so it could be argued that the 
influence of role modelling and conversations about giving may differ between parents who 
volunteer compared to those who do not undertake voluntary work. A similar argument could 
also be made for whether the parent reports a religious denomination or not. All these 
characteristics might influence the intergenerational transmission in different ways and so we 
test the equality of the key parameters between groups, explicitly: sons ± daughters; white ± 
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non-white; parent volunteers ± non volunteer; and family religious ± non religious. The 
results of testing the equality of the inter-generational coefficient 0J , the verbalisation 
coefficient 0O , and the interaction coefficient 0I  are shown in Table 3. Interestingly, the only 
group where statistical differences are found in the key coefficients is for those families 
reporting a religious denomination relative to those who do not. 
We have repeated the univariate empirical analysis of equations (1) and (2) 
decomposing parental donations into those to religious and non-religious organisations, the 
results are reported in Table 4 in Panels A and B respectively where four specifications are 
shown as in Table 2. The analysis reveals that, when the binary parent donating indicator is 
replaced with whether the parent donates to a religious cause, see Panel A, the 
intergenerational marginal effect, 0J , is always positive and statistically significant associated 
with around a 10 percentage point increase in the probability that the child donates. Focusing 
on the amount of religious donation made by the family, this is always statistically significant 
with a one per cent increase in the level of the donation associated with around a 2 percentage 
points higher probability that the child donates. The effect of the parent talking about 
donating remains in terms of statistical significance and economic magnitude. There is no 
evidence to support the premise that direct attempts by the parent to influence their 
RIIVSULQJ¶VEHKDYLRXUVWUHQJWKHQWKHLQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDOFRUUHODWLRQLQGRQDWLQJEHKDYLRXULH
the null hypothesis that 0 = 0I  is not rejected. Conversely replacing the parental donating 
indicator with one for whether the parent donates to non-religious organisations is statistically 
insignificant when talking to the child about donating is included in the specification, see 
Table 4 Panel B. However, the effect of talking remains throughout.19  Thus the results 
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 Unfortunately the CDS data does not have information on the type of donation made by the child, so we can 
only decompose parental donations and not match this to the type of charity the child donates to. This is an 
interesting avenue for future research if such data should become available. 
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suggest that the transmission of religious giving is stronger potentially as a by-product of the 
transmission of religion (although this is controlled for at the family level). 
Univariate Analysis ± Robustness 
The analysis thus far has dealt with repeated observations on the same child, which can be a 
maximum of two years, by clustering at this level of aggregation. What follows aims to 
investigate whether the results are sensitive to: (i) employing a child fixed effects estimator; 
(ii) clustering at both the child and sibling level, i.e. two-way clustering of the standard 
errors; and (iii) adopting a sibling fixed effects estimator. In the robustness analysis we focus 
upon overall charitable donations for brevity. 20  In order to implement a fixed effects 
estimator and adopt two-way clustering of the standard errors, we use the linear probability 
model (LPM). Firstly, equations (1) and (2) are re-estimated using the LPM clustering at the 
child level to see whether the results are similar to that of the univariate probit estimator. The 
results are reported in Table 5 Panel A which has the same structure as Table 2. Columns 1 
and 2 are based on estimating equations (1) and (2) conditional on whether the parent donates 
to charity, whereas columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis but are based on the amount that the 
parent donates. Clearly, in terms of the magnitudes of the coefficients and statistical 
significance of the primary variables of interest, the findings are very similar to that of the 
probit specifications. 21  In particular, a parent talking to their child about donating is 
associated with around an 11 percentage points higher probability of the child donating. In 
Panels B and C of Table 5, we re-estimate the same specifications allowing for child fixed 
effects and two way clustering, respectively. 
 The advantage of the LPM fixed effects estimator is that for some children we have 
two observations at different points in time and hence it is possible to account for 
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 Results from splitting donations into religious and non-religious causes are available from the authors upon 
request. 
21
 This is despite the well-known drawbacks of using the LPM to model binary outcomes, see Greene (2012) for 
a discussion of such issues.  
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unobservable time invariant child effects which might influence their decision to donate. 
Specifically, introducing child, C, and time, t, subscripts to the error terms in equations (1) 
and (2), C C Ct tH D Q  , the error can be decomposed into a fixed effect CD  and a white noise 
component C tQ  where the former is the unobservable component. Table 5 Panel B 
summarises the results of employing the fixed effects estimator and the analysis essentially 
reveals that the results are robust to removing the child fixed effect.22 
In the empirical analysis discussed thus far, the standard errors are clustered at the 
cross sectional unit of observation, i.e. the child, with the exception of the LPM child fixed 
effects estimator. However, it is possible that there are multiple children (siblings) in the 
sample and so it may also be important to take into account clustering at this additional level 
of aggregation. Indeed, for our sample of children, only 45% have no siblings in the sample. 
To investigate this, we apply the Cameron et al. (2011) estimator, where standard errors in 
the current application are clustered both at the child and family level. Failing to 
accommodate the potential clustering within families could result in standard errors being 
under-estimated. The results of the two way clustering analysis are shown in Table 5 Panel C 
where only the t-statistics differ (the point estimates are the same). Again the results are 
consistent with those discussed above. The predominant finding is that it is whether the 
parent talks to their offspring about donating that matters with the effect remaining 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The presence of siblings in the data enables us to employ an alternative strategy which 
will help improve upon the identification of the influence of parents talking to their offspring 
XSRQWKHFKLOG¶Vdecision to donate. To do this, we employ a sibling fixed effects estimator 
where variation that occurs at the sibling level is exploited. This is important in that different 
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 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting the possibility that the difference in the estimated 
coefficients for parental giving in Panels A and B could imply that the transmission only occurs among those 
children who are sensitive to parental influence, which is consistent with the results based on the sibling fixed 
effects model presented in Panel D discussed below. 
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children, for exogenous reasons, may have been exposed differently to their parent talking to 
them about making charitable donations. Hence, this potential within family variation enables 
us to isolate the effect of this verbal directive from influences that both siblings would have 
been exposed to, i.e. family level covariates including whether the parent donates. The 
approach we use can be summarised as follows: 
   1 2 1 2 1 2C C C CY Y T T 'O H     X X E         (8) 
TKHVXSHUVFULSWVµ¶DQGµ¶UHIHUWRWKHWZRVLEOLQJVwithin the same household, and CsX  is a 
vector of child specific covariates for sibling s, specifically: age; gender; test scores; log 
allowance; child behaviour; and number of friends, where in equation (8) these covariates are 
entered as a vector of sibling differences, 1 2C CX X . In this model all family covariates, 
including whether the parent donates since this is defined at the household level (see Section 
2), are differenced out of the analysis. Selecting families with two siblings and arranging the 
data to employ the specification in equation (8) yields 729 observations at the family level, 
i.e. 1,458 children, where only 36% of observations have no variation in both the sibling 
difference of donating, 1 2C CY Y , and the sibling difference in the parent talking to the child, 
1 2T T . The results are shown in the final row, Panel D, of Table 5 where we report the 
estimated O  parameter only. Clearly, the influence of the parental directive is still apparent, 
statistically significant, and this is after isolating the common effects upon siblings stemming 
from family environment and other family fixed effects, both observable, e.g. parental 
donating behaviour and parental education, and unobservable. Arguably this approach helps 
to identify the impact of parental verbal directives, exploiting the different exposure of 
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siblings to their SDUHQWV¶ WDONLQJ WR WKHLU FKLOGUHQDERXWPDNLQJFKDULWDEOHGRQDWLRQVZLWKLQ
the same household.23 
Multivariate Analysis 
We now explore the potential problem of endogeneity in the key covariates of interest, i.e. 
whether the parent donates to charity or the amount donated and whether they talk to their 
child about donating. This analysis is based upon estimating the multivariate system of 
equations, (3a-3c) and (4a-4c), and the results are presented in Tables 6 to 8. In each 
alternative model, the joint test that the correlation in the three error terms is equal to zero is 
rejected endorsing the modelling approach and implying endogeneity between the key 
variables of interest.24 Table 6 presents the marginal effects from estimating the trivariate 
probit model (equations 3a-3c) relating to the exogenous variables for: the probability of 
whether the parent makes any donations; the probability that the parent talks to the child 
about donations; and the associated marginal effects related to the probability that the child 
donates are presented (where direct, indirect and total effects are shown). Table 7 follows a 
similar structure showing the coefficients (for the censored, i.e. tobit, part of the model) and 
marginal effects from estimating the simultaneous model (equations 4a-4c) relating to the 
endogenous variables for: the amount donated to charitable causes; the probability that the 
parent talks to the child about donations; and the associated marginal effects related to the 
probability that the child donates are presented (again direct, indirect and total effects are 
shown). Table 8 reports the associated treatment effects on the key variables of interest.  
It is apparent from the first column in Table 6 that head of household characteristics 
such as ethnicity and years of schooling all influence the probability that the parent donates to 
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 An important caveat to note is that this identification strategy is only valid if the sibling variation in exposure 
to the parental talking about donating is exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with unobserved sibling differences which 
may influence their decision to donate to charity. 
24
 For equations (3a-3c), the chi-squared statistic associated with testing the hypothesis that the three U 
parameters are jointly equal to zero is 44.99 (p-value=0.000). The corresponding chi-squared statistic and p-
value for equations (4a-4c) is 83.71 (p-value=0.000). 
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charity. Statistically significant positive effects are also apparent from household labour 
income, wealth and home ownership, signalling the importance of financial factors. The 
positive marginal effect relating to volunteering ties in with the notion that donating money 
and donating time to charitable causes are complementary activities, see, for example, 
Wilhelm et al. (2011). In terms of the instruments used in the parental donating equation, 
both the proportion of households donating in the state where the family resides, matched to 
the parent¶s age, and past medical itemization have a positive and statistically significant 
influence on parental donating behaviour. Covariates are found to have a similar influence 
when considering the amount donated, see Table 7, in addition the gender of the parent and 
age are also statistically significant.  
The outcome of whether the parent talks to their child about donating behaviour is 
shown in the second column of Tables 6 and 7. Family and parental characteristics which are 
significantly associated with this outcome are: years of schooling; ethnicity; and home 
ownership. In terms of the instruments employed, all three, i.e. whether the parent discusses 
school studies, and/or they talk about the news, and whether the family eats meals together, 
are all individually and also jointly significant. For example, whether the family eat together 
on a daily basis is associated with around a 3 percentage point higher probability that the 
child donates to charity.  
Statistically significant positive effects on the probability that the child donates to 
charity, see Tables 6 and 7 final column, are apparent from the number of friends that the 
child hasWKHFKLOG¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQYROXQWHHUVHUYLFHDFWLYLWLHV, and the number of years of 
schooling of the parent. Inverse direct effects on the probability that the child donates are 
apparent for male children, white children, and the level of household non labour income. 
Both sets of instruments used in modelling whether the parent donates to charity (i.e. the 
proportion of households donating in the state where the family resides, and previous medical 
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itemization) and whether the parent talks about donating to the child (i.e. whether on a daily 
basis the parent discusses school studies, they talk about current affairs, and they eat together) 
are jointly insignificant in the child donating equation.25 Hence, our findings would suggest 
that the instruments perform well in a statistical sense and we would argue they are viable 
intuitively (see Section 2 above). 
The ATEs, ATETs and ATEUTs are shown for the binary endogenous variables (i.e. 
whether the parent donates to charity and whether they talk to the child about donating) in 
Table 8 panel A. These are also reported in Table 8 panel B for the binary endogenous 
variable, i.e. whether the parent talks to the child about donating, and average marginal 
effects (AMEs) estimated over all individuals for the continuous endogenous variable (i.e. the 
amount donated). It is apparent from Table 8 Panel A (Panel B) that the treatment effects 
(AME) of whether the parent donates to charity on whether the child donates to charity 
(amount donated to charity) are all positive, yet statistically insignificant. This is not 
surprising given that there are no significant indirect effects stemming from the parental 
donating equation RQWKHFKLOG¶VGRQDWLQJGHFLVLRQDVFDQEHVHHQIURPWKHDQWL-penultimate 
column of Tables 6 and 7. Conversely, it is clear from both of the models estimated that the 
effects from the parent talking to their child about donating to charity are large, positive and 
statistically significant, at around 13 percentage points in the multivariate probit model (see 
Table 8 Panel A). This is due to the significant indirect effects of the parent talking to their 
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 To further provide some insight into the validity of the instruments in the parent donates equation, namely the 
proportion of households donating by state-age reference group and whether the family itemized for medical 
expenses in the previous year, we adopt an approach to exogeneity following Smith and Blundell (1986). To do 
this, equations (3a) and (3c) are estimated separately as univariate probit models. Initially, equation (3a) is 
estimated and then we test whether the residuals (linear prediction) from the first stage regression, i.e. the 
SDUHQW¶VGRQDWLQJHTXDWLRQ are statistically significant in HTXDWLRQF LH WKHFKLOG¶VGRQDWLQJequation. The 
residuals from the first stage are found to be statistically insignificant in the child donating equation (3c) and the 
instruments are jointly statistically significant in the parental donating equation at the 1% level, implying  
validity of their use in this application. We adopt the same approach to test the validity of the instruments in the 
WDONLQJHTXDWLRQEQDPHO\ZKHWKHUWKHSDUHQWGLVFXVVHVWKHFKLOG¶VVWXGLHVRQDGDLO\EDVLVZKHWKHUWKH\WDON
about current affairs on a daily basis, and whether the family eats meals together daily. The residuals from 
equation (3b) are insignificant in the child donating equation (3c) and are jointly significant in the talking 
equation at the 1% level, which again implies validity of the instruments. 
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offspring about making charitable donations on the decision of the child to donate (see 
penultimate column of Tables 6 and 7). This would suggest that, whilst there is no direct 
intergenerational effect from the overall donating behaviour of parents on their children¶V
donating behaviour, talking about donating appears to be important.  
The exception to this is when we decompose parental donations into religious causes 
and non-religious causes where the treatment effects are shown in Tables 9 and 10 
respectively.26 There is evidence of an intergenerational effect between whether the parent 
makes a donation to a religious charity and the probability that the child donates. Specifically, 
the treatment effect is approximately 10 percentage points (Table 9 Panel A) which is similar 
in magnitude to the univariate results reported in Table 4 Panel A. Generally, the role of 
talking to the child is consistent with the previous findings for overall charitable donations 
with the treatment effects of talking to the child dominating the religious intergenerational 
coefficient in terms of magnitude. There is no evidence, however, that the intergenerational 
coefficient is influenced by talking to children since the interaction term is always 
statistically insignificant for all charitable donations and where donations are decomposed. 
This implies WKDWSDUHQWVDUHDEOH WR LQIOXHQFH WKLVDVSHFWRI WKHLURIIVSULQJ¶VEHKDYLRXUvia 
verbalisations, consistent with the psychology literature, e.g. Lévy-Garboua et al. (2006), 
which may serve to nurture the generosity and altruistic behaviour of their children.27  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have contributed to the empirical literature on the analysis of charitable 
donations by exploring the relationship between the donating behaviour of parents and their 
offspring aged less than 18, i.e. pre-adulthood. Our findings suggest that whether the parent 
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 Full marginal effects for the two decompositions are available from the authors upon request. 
27
 Since the question about which the child gives UHIHUV WRµODVW\HDU¶we cannot rule out the possibility that a 
positive response to the talking question shows that parents talk to the child about previous giving. The fact that 
talking about giving is significant in all specifications estimated could imply that the effect from talking is a 
result of past giving by the child and not vice versa. However, the correlation coefficient between whether the 
child donated in the previous year and whether the parent talks to the child is relatively small at 0.0351 and 
statistically insignificant (p-value=0.3409) so arguably this is unlikely to be a concern. 
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donates to charity and whether the parent talks to the child about donating both have positive 
influences on the probability that the child donates to charity. However, the intergenerational 
effect UHODWLQJ WR WKHSDUHQW¶VGRQDWLQJEHKDYLRXU is driven to statistical insignificance once 
we simultaneously control for whether the parent talks to their child about donating. The only 
exception to this is when parental donations are decomposed into religious and non-religious 
causes where for the former there is evidence of a direct intergenerational effect. This 
suggests that parents through talking DUH DEOH WR LQIOXHQFH WKLV DVSHFW RI WKHLU RIIVSULQJV¶
behaviour and help to nurture the generosity and altruistic behaviour of their children.28  
Dohmen et al. (2012), p.23 state µthere are at least three potential transmission 
channels: genetics, child learning by imitation, and deliberate efforts by parents to shape the 
SUHIHUHQFHV DQG EHOLHIV RI WKHLU FKLOGUHQ¶29 As argued by Dohmen et al. (2012), shedding 
light on the existence of such intergenerational relationships is important regardless of the 
prevailing transmission mechanism due to its implications for important issues such as social 
mobility or the persistence of cultural differences or economic outcomes such as income, 
wealth and educational attainment. The results herein are consistent with parents shaping 
WKHLUFKLOG¶VSUHIHUHQFHVWKURXJKWDONLQJDERXWGRQDWLQJ 
Schokkaert (2006) discusses the important role that social learning plays via 
reinforcement or imitation in the formation of preferences. Moreover, evidence suggests a 
hysteresis effect in that someone who has donated in the past is more likely to donate in the 
future. Thus, it may be the case that individuals who donate during childhood are more likely 
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 It is important to acknowledge that, throughout the paper, it is assumed that intergenerational transmission 
occurs from parents to children. However, Harris (1998), who  summarises the research in developmental 
psychology, argues that causality in parent-child relationships is bidirectional, parents influence their children 
DQG FKLOGUHQ DOVR LQIOXHQFH WKHLU SDUHQWV µWKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ D SDUHQW DQG D FKLOG OLNH DQ\ RWKHU
relationship between two individuals, is a two-ZD\ VWUHHW¶ S )XUWKHUPRUH +DUULV  DUJXHV WKDW LI
parHQWVGRKDYHHIIHFWVRQFKLOGUHQLWPXVWEHDGLIIHUHQWHIIHFWIRUGLIIHUHQWFKLOGUHQµVLQFHFKLOGUHQUDLVHGE\
WKHVDPHSDUHQWVGRQRWWXUQRXWDOLNH¶S+HQFHDVDUJXHGE\DQDQRQ\PRXVUHYLHZHUVRPHFKLOGUHQPD\
EH VHQVLWLYH WR SDUHQWDO µSUHDFKLQJ¶ DERXW WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI JHQHURVLW\ ZKLOH RWKHUV DUH QRW RU OHVV VR 7KH
former type of children may attract more conversations about giving. 
29
 As highlighted by an anonymous referee, the three channels distinguished by Dohmen et al. (2012) are similar 
to those distinguished by Bekkers (2007). 
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to donate as adults. We provide some preliminary evidence for this by tracking 1,487 children 
(observed in either 2001 or 2007) into adulthood in the latest wave of the PSID in 2011. For 
this sub sample, the average age when observed as a child (adult) is 14 (23). The correlation 
between whether individuals donated as children and whether they donated to charity in early 
adulthood is 0.1103 (p-value 0.000), which is consistent with a hysteresis effect. 
Philanthropic behaviour has already attracted considerable attention in the economics 
literature yet to date little is known about the intergenerational relationship between the 
donating behaviour of parents and their offspring. Our empirical findings have served to shed 
some light on how parents influence the donating behaviour of their children and hopefully 
will serve to stimulate further interest in this research area. 
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TABLE 1: Summary statistics and variable definitions 
 
DEFINITION MEAN S.D. 
Child variables    
Male child Gender of child: 1=male, 0=female 0.51 0.50 
White child Ethnicity of child: 1=white, 0=non white 0.23 0.42 
Age of child Age of child 8 to 17 13.27 2.55 
Age of child squared Age of child squared 182.53 66.49 
1 sibling in the household Siblings: 1=child has 1 sibling in the household, 0=other 0.47 0.49 
2+ siblings in the household Siblings: 1=child has 2 or more siblings in the household, 0=other  0.08 0.28 
Child health good/very good Health of child: 1=good or very good, 0=other 0.44 0.50 
Child health excellent Health of child: 1=excellent, 0=other 0.53 0.49 
Number of friends Number of friends child has: 0,...,4+ 2.63 1.20 
Log allowance# Natural logarithm of  FKLOG¶VZHHNO\DOORZDQFH 1.33 1.71 
Child volunteers Child volunteered during past 12 months: 1=yes, 0=no 0.32 0.47 
Letter word Standardised letter word test score 0 1 
Passage comprehension Standardised passage comprehension test score 0 1 
Applied Problems Standardised applied problem test score 0 1 
Behaviour Factor analysis of behavioural traits of the child 0.44 0.98 
Parent/family variables    
Age Age of parent (head or spouse): 18 to 81 40.50 7.56 
Age squared Age of parent squared 1,697.42 638.60 
Male Gender of parent: 1=male, 0=female 0.69 0.46 
White Ethnicity of parent: 1=white, 0=non white 0.45 0.49 
Years of schooling Schooling of parent: 8 (8th grade or below) to 17 (post graduate) 12.69 2.44 
Health good/very good Health of parent: 1=good or very good, 0=other 0.65 0.48 
Health excellent Health of parent: 1=excellent, 0=other 0.23 0.42 
Log labour income# Natural logarithm of annual labour income of husband & wife 9.74 2.83 
Log non labour income# Natural logarithm of annual non labour income husband & wife 3.50 4.15 
Log wealth# Natural logarithm of annual stocks/shares, checking/savings 5.24 4.03 
Own home Housing tenure: 1=owned outright/or mortgage, 0=other 0.64 0.48 
Catholic Family religious denomination: 1=catholic, 0=other 0.22 0.42 
Protestant Family religious denomination: 1=protestant, 0=other 0.65 0.48 
Other religion Family religious denomination: 1=other religion, 0=other 0.06 0.24 
Price One minus the tax rate 0.83 0.12 
Number of hours volunteer Unpaid hours parent(s) volunteered over past year 0-3,650 69.60 252.46 
% donate state-age Mean proportion donating at state level by age (18+) 0.59 0.10 
Medical itemize Family itemized for medical expenses lagged: 1=yes, 0=no 0.08 0.27 
Discuss studies Parent discusses what child studies in school: 1=daily, 0=other 0.49 0.50 
Talk news Parent talks to child about current affairs/ news: 1=daily, 0=other 0.12 0.33 
Family eat Child eats with family: 1=daily basis, 0=other 0.38 0.47 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
#All monetary variables are given in 2007 prices. For all monetary variables, in order to convert to natural logarithms, we add one to the 
level of the variable in question. 
TABLE 2: Marginal Effects: Univariate models of the probability that the child donates to charity 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Child covariates         
Male child -0.0490 (2.96) -0.0475 (2.88) -0.0501 (3.03) -0.0485 (2.94) 
White child -0.0480 (2.20) -0.0354 (1.62) -0.0474 (2.17) -0.0353 (1.61) 
Age of child -0.0183 (0.56) -0.0124 (0.39) -0.0156 (0.48) -0.0109 (0.34) 
Age of child squared 0.0006 (0.47) 0.0004 (0.37) 0.0005 (0.41) 0.0004 (0.33) 
1 sibling in the household -0.0224 (1.34) -0.0228 (1.37) -0.0230 (1.38) -0.0231 (1.39) 
2+ siblings in the household 0.0491 (1.59) 0.0434 (1.41) 0.0470 (1.52) 0.0421 (1.37) 
Child health good/very good 0.0419 (0.94) 0.0432 (0.98) 0.0436 (0.98) 0.0446 (1.02) 
Child health excellent 0.0038 (0.09) 0.0102 (0.23) 0.0036 (0.08) 0.0099 (0.22) 
Number of friends 0.0143 (2.10) 0.0106 (1.56) 0.0131 (1.92) 0.0098 (1.45) 
Log allowance 0.0051 (1.04) 0.0020 (0.41) 0.0055 (1.11) 0.0024 (0.49) 
Child volunteers 0.1357 (7.32) 0.1291 (7.01) 0.1323 (7.13) 0.1267 (6.87) 
Letter word -0.0286 (1.96) -0.0299 (2.07) -0.0293 (2.01) -0.0304 (2.11) 
Passage comprehension 0.0415 (2.72) 0.0379 (2.52) 0.0399 (2.63) 0.0369 (2.46) 
Applied Problems 0.0218 (1.54) 0.0246 (1.74) 0.0202 (1.43) 0.0232 (1.65) 
Behaviour 0.0079 (0.98) 0.0038 (0.48) 0.0078 (0.98) 0.0040 (0.50) 
Parent/family covariates         
Log labour income -0.0052 (1.70) -0.0050 (1.60) -0.0056 (1.76) -0.0053 (1.69) 
Log non labour income -0.0059 (3.02) -0.0059 (3.07) -0.0056 (2.90) -0.0058 (2.99) 
Log wealth -0.0028 (1.15) -0.0025 (1.01) -0.0038 (1.53) -0.0032 (1.30) 
Own home 0.0027 (0.14) -0.0043 (0.23) -0.0034 (0.18) -0.0086 (0.46) 
Price 0.0557 (0.83) 0.0438 (0.66) 0.0554 (0.83) 0.0444 (0.67) 
Catholic 0.0447 (1.34) 0.0496 (1.49) 0.0453 (1.36) 0.0498 (1.50) 
Protestant 0.0833 (2.75) 0.0840 (2.81) 0.0822 (2.72) 0.0830 (2.78) 
Other religion 0.0062 (0.14) 0.0078 (0.18) 0.0046 (0.11) 0.0064 (0.15) 
Parent donates to charity 0.0520 (2.78) 0.0179 (0.62) ± ± 
Talk about donating ± 0.1054 (4.35) ± ± 
Parent donates×Talk ± 0.0254 (0.76) ± ± 
Log parental donation ± ± 0.0102 (4.12) 0.0050 (1.25) 
Talk about donating ± ± ± 0.1025 (4.35) 
Log parent donation×Talk ± ± ± 0.0032 (0.72) 
Wald chi squared (d); p-value 156.54;  p-value=[0.000] 
199.66;  
p-value=[0.000] 
165.56;  
p-value=[0.000] 
203.73;  
p-value=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
Note: In specifications 1 and 3 (2 and 4) d=24 (d=26). 
 
  
 
TABLE 3: Tests of equality of key coefficients between groups 
 SON ± DAUGHTER WHITE ± NON WHITE PARENT: VOLUNTEER ± 
NON VOLUNTEER 
FAMILY: RELIGIOUS ± 
NON RELIGIOUS 
Equation 1     ߛ ߛ௦௢௡ ൌ ߛௗ௔௨௚௛௧௘௥ ߛ௪௛௜௧௘ ൌ ߛ௡௢௡௪௛௜௧௘ ߛ௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ൌ ߛ௡௢௡௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ߛ௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ ൌ ߛ௡௢௡௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ 
F2(1); p-value 0.40; p=0.5253 0.24; p=0.6248 0.09; p=0.7626 0.66; p=0.4177 
Equation 2     ߛ ߛ௦௢௡ ൌ ߛௗ௔௨௚௛௧௘௥ ߛ௪௛௜௧௘ ൌ ߛ௡௢௡௪௛௜௧௘ ߛ௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ൌ ߛ௡௢௡௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ߛ௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ ൌ ߛ௡௢௡௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ 
F2(1); p-value 0.02; p=0.8764 0.05; p=0.8264 0.50; p=0.4748 0.63; p=0.4279 ߣ ߣ௦௢௡ ൌ ߣௗ௔௨௚௛௧௘௥ ߣ௪௛௜௧௘ ൌ ߣ௡௢௡௪௛௜௧௘ ߣ௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ൌ ߣ௡௢௡௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ߣ௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ ൌ ߣ௡௢௡௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ 
F2(1); p-value 0.01; p=0.9521 1.78; p=0.1818 1.98; p=0.1591 4.33; p=0.0379 ߶ ߶௦௢௡ ൌ ߶ௗ௔௨௚௛௧௘௥ ߶௪௛௜௧௘ ൌ ߶௡௢௡௪௛௜௧௘ ߶௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ൌ ߶௡௢௡௩௢௟௨௡௧௘௘௥ ߶௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ ൌ ߶௡௢௡௥௘௟௜௚௜௢௨௦ 
F2(1); p-value 0.53; p=0.4652 0.96; p=0.3263 1.14; p=0.2859 4.16; p=0.0413 
Notes: ߛ is the intergenerational coefficient, i.e. on whether the parent donates; ߣ is the coefficient on whether the parent talks to their child about donating; and ߶ is the coefficient 
on the interaction term between whether the parent donates and talking about charitable donations to their child. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4:  Marginal Effects: Univariate models of the probability that the child donates to charity ± parental decomposition of donations. 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
PANEL A: religious donations 
        
Parent donates to religious charity 0.1136 (6.49) 0.0978 (3.11) ± ± 
Talk about donating ± 0.1084 (5.39) ± ± 
Parent donates to religious charity×Talk ± -0.0073 (0.20) ± ± 
Log parental donation to religious charity ± ± 0.0195 (7.48) 0.0169 (3.33) 
Talk about donating ± ± ± 0.1031 (5.20) 
Log parent donation to religious charity×Talk ± ± ± -0.0009 (0.16) 
Wald chi squared (d); p-value 182.92;  p-value=[0.000] 
216.66;  
p-value=[0.000] 
192. 62;  
p-value=[0.000] 
223.18;  
p-value=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
PANEL B: non-religous donations 
        
Parent donates to non-religious charity 0.0503 (2.67) 0.0186 (0.65) ± ± 
Talk about donating ± 0.1071 (4.47) ± ± 
Parent donates to non-religious charity×Talk ± 0.0234 (0.70) ± ± 
Log parental donation to non-religious charity ± ± 0.0095 (3.60) 0.0047 (1.13) 
Talk about donating ± ± ± 0.1064 (4.58) 
Log parent donation to non-religious charity×Talk ± ± ± 0.0028 (0.61) 
Wald chi squared (d); p-value 156.30;  p-value=[0.000] 
199.85;  
p-value=[0.000] 
162.72;  
p-value=[0.000] 
202.80;  
p-value=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
Notes: (i) control variables in both Panels A and B are as given in Table 2. (ii) Note: In specifications 1 and 3 (2 and 4) d=24 (d=26). 
 TABLE 5: Robustness analysis of the probability that the child donates to charity 
PANEL A: LPM (OLS) 
1 2 3 4 
COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT 
Parent donates to charity 0.0553 (2.86) 0.0237 (0.72) ± ± 
Talk about donating ± 0.1164 (4.26) ± ± 
Parent donates×Talk ± 0.0201 (0.54) ± ± 
Log parental donation ± ± 0.0105 (4.16) 0.0061 (1.33) 
Talk about donating ± ± ± 0.1153 (4.32) 
Log parent donation×Talk ± ± ± 0.0019 (0.39) 
F statistic (d1, d2); p-value 
7.52;  
p-value=[0.000] 
9.55;  
p-value=[0.000] 
7.96;  
p-value=[0.000] 
9.16;  
p-value=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
PANEL B: Child Fixed 
Effects 
1 2 3 4 
COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT 
Parent donates to charity 0.0349 (0.81) 0.0412 (0.81) ± ± 
Talk about donating ± 0.1375 (3.19) ± ± 
Parent donates×Talk ± 0.0093 (0.18) ± ± 
Log parental donation ± ± 0.0102 (4.12) 0.0088 (1.09) 
Talk about donating ± ± ± 0.1416 (3.31) 
Log parent donation×Talk ± ± ± 0.0031 (0.38) 
F statistic (d1, d2); p-value 
5.54;  
p-value=[0.000] 
1.62;  
p-value=[0.029] 
5.28;  
p-value=[0.000] 
1.67;  
p-value=[0.022] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
PANEL C: Two-way 
Clustering 
1 2 3 4 
COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT COEF TSTAT 
Parent donates to charity 0.0553 (2.68) 0.0237 (0.69) ± ± 
Talk about donating ± 0.1164 (3.98) ± ± 
Parent donates×Talk ± 0.0201 (0.52) ± ± 
Log parental donation ± ± 0.0105 (3.92) 0.0061 (1.28) 
Talk about donating ± ± ± 0.1153 (4.06) 
Log parent donation×Talk ± ± ± 0.0019 (0.38) 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
PANEL D: Sibling Fixed  
Effects 
    
COEF TSTAT       
Difference in talking about 
donating;  1 2T T  0.0562 (1.97) 
    
F statistic (d1, d2); p-value 
3.95; 
p-value=[0.000]     
OBSERVATIONS 729 
Notes: (i) Control variables in each panel are as in Table 2A. (ii) Degrees of freedom in Panel A d1=24 (specifications 1 and 3) or d1=26 
(specifications 2 and 4) and d2=2,365. (iii) Degrees of freedom in Panel B d1=23 (specifications 1 and 3) or d1=25 (specifications 2 and 
4); and d2=716 (specification 1 and 3) or d2=714 (specifications 2 and 4). (iii) In Panel C the standard errors are clustered at the child and 
sibling level using the Cameron et al. (2011) estimator. (iv) In Panel D there is only one specification since whether the parent donates 
(log $ amount donated) is differenced out of the model, as is the interaction term, along with all other family level covariates. (v) In Panel 
D the degrees of freedom are d1=8 and d2=721. 
 
TABLE 6: Marginal Effects: Probability (parent donates =1); Probability (parent talks to the child about donating = 1); and Probability (child donates = 1) 
 
 
Prob. (parent 
donates=1): P 1Y   
 
Prob. (parent talks to child  
about donating=1): 1T   
Prob. (child donates=1): C 1Y   
 Direct effect Indirect effect from 
parent donating 
Indirect effect from 
talking to child 
Total effect 
 M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  
Child covariates             
Male child 0.0558 *** -0.0089  -0.0488 *** 0.0022  -0.0014  -0.0480 *** 
White child -0.0597 *** -0.0172  -0.0335 * -0.0023  -0.0026  -0.0384 *** 
Age of child -0.0054  -0.0672 *** -0.0120  -0.0022  -0.0103 *** -0.0244  
Age of child squared 0.0016  0.0015  0.0004  0.0001  0.0002  0.0007  
1 sibling in the household 0.0029  0.0138  -0.0232  0.0001  0.0021  -0.0210  
2+ siblings in the household -0.0010  0.0315  0.0441  0.0001  0.0048  0.0489  
Child health good/very good -0.0787  0.0191  0.0429  -0.0031  0.0029  0.0428  
Child health excellent -0.0365  -0.0163  0.0098  -0.0014  -0.0025  0.0059  
Number of friends 0.0198 *** 0.0387 *** 0.0099  0.0008  0.0059 *** 0.0166 *** 
Log allowance 0.0016  0.0209 *** 0.0014  0.0001  0.0032 *** 0.0047  
Child volunteers 0.0913 *** 0.0546 *** 0.1307 *** 0.0036  0.0084 *** 0.1427 *** 
Letter word 0.0327 *** 0.0083  -0.0307 *** 0.0013  0.0013  -0.0281  
Passage comprehension 0.0452 *** 0.0356 *** 0.0375 *** 0.0018  0.0055  0.0448 *** 
Applied Problems -0.0043  -0.0100  0.0253  -0.0002  -0.0015  0.0236  
Behaviour -0.0129  0.0275 *** 0.0038  -0.0005  0.0042 *** 0.0075  
Parent/family covariates             
Log labour income 0.0121 *** -0.0008  -0.0050  0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0047  
Log non labour income 0.0026  0.0023  -0.0060 *** 0.0001  0.0004  -0.0055 *** 
Log wealth 0.0311 *** 0.0030  -0.0027  0.0012  0.0005  -0.0011  
Own home 0.1220 *** 0.0745 *** -0.0065  0.0048  0.0114 *** 0.0097  
Price 0.0573  0.1268 *** 0.0416  0.0022  0.0195  0.0633  
Catholic -0.0081  -0.0477  0.0505  -0.0003  -0.0073  0.0429  
Protestant 0.0143  -0.0090  0.0857 *** 0.0006  -0.0014  0.0849 *** 
Other religion 0.0631  -0.0018  0.0072  0.0025  -0.0018  0.0079  
Age 0.0163  0.0114  ±  0.0006  0.0018  0.0024  
Age squared -0.0001  -0.0001  ±  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
Male 0.0368  0.0234  ±  0.0014  0.0036  0.0050  
White 0.0598 *** -0.1530 *** ±  0.0023  -0.0235 *** -0.0212 *** 
Years of schooling 0.0354 *** 0.0088 *** ±  0.0014  0.0014 *** 0.0027 *** 
Health good/very good 0.0315  -0.0008  ±  0.0012  -0.0001  0.0011  
Health excellent 0.0611 *** 0.0260  ±  0.0024  0.0040  0.0064  
Number of hours volunteer 0.0002 *** ±  ±  0.0001  ±  0.0001  
% donate state-age 0.4121 *** ±  ±  0.0161  ±  0.0161  
Medical itemize 0.1113 *** ±  ±  0.0044  ±  0.0044  
Discuss studies ±  0.0406 *** ±  ±  0.0062 ** 0.0062 ** 
Talk news ±  0.0608 *** ±  ±  0.0093 ** 0.0093 *** 
Family eat ±  0.0310 **** ±  ±  0.0048 ** 0.0048  
Chi Squared (91); p value 1,210.13; p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
***, **, *
 denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. 
TABLE 7: Marginal Effects: Log amount parent donates to charity; Probability (parent talks to the child about donating = 1); and Probability (child donates = 1) 
 
 
Log $ amount parent 
donates:  PLog D  
 
Prob. (parent talks to child  
about donating=1): 1T   
Prob. (child donates=1): C 1Y   
 Direct effect Indirect effect amount 
parent donates 
Indirect effect from 
talking to child 
Total effect 
 COEF  M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  M.E.  
Child covariates             
Male child 0.5334 *** -0.0095  -0.0508 *** 0.0050  -0.0030  -0.0488 *** 
White child -0.6945 *** -0.0146  -0.0195  -0.0066  -0.0046  -0.0307  
Age of child -0.7130 *** -0.0664 *** -0.0011  -0.0067  -0.0208 *** -0.0286  
Age of child squared 0.0210  0.0015  0.0002  0.0002  0.0005  0.0008  
1 sibling in the household -0.0126  0.0124  -0.0258  -0.0001  0.0039  -0.0221  
2+ siblings in the household 0.0752  0.0332  0.0372  0.0009  0.0104  0.0485  
Child health good/very good -0.6620  0.0153  0.0473  -0.0061  0.0048  0.0461  
Child health excellent -0.2387  -0.0181  0.0158  -0.0021  -0.0057  0.0080  
Number of friends 0.2422 *** 0.0385 *** 0.0033  0.0022  0.0121 *** 0.0176 *** 
Log allowance -0.0277  0.0198 *** -0.0022  -0.0003  0.0062 *** 0.0038  
Child volunteers 0.8097 *** 0.0521 *** 0.1205 *** 0.0076  0.0163 *** 0.1444 *** 
Letter word 0.4971 *** 0.0079  -0.0340 *** 0.0046  0.0025 * -0.0269 * 
Passage comprehension 0.4909 *** 0.0347 *** 0.0310  0.0046  0.0109  0.0465  
Applied Problems -0.0630  -0.0087  0.0277  -0.0005  -0.0027  0.0244  
Behaviour -0.1365  0.0279 *** -0.0007  -0.0012  0.0088 ***** 0.0069  
Parent/family covariates             
Log labour income 0.1645 *** -0.0004  -0.0057 *** 0.0016  -0.0001  -0.0043  
Log non labour income 0.0128  0.0022  -0.0061 *** 0.0001  0.0007  -0.0053  
Log wealth 0.3198 *** 0.0028  -0.0043  0.0030  0.0009  -0.0004  
Own home 1.5694 *** 0.0737 *** -0.0268  0.0147  0.0231 *** 0.0111  
Price 0.2448  0.1233 *** 0.0247  0.0026  0.0387 * 0.0060  
Catholic -0.3324  -0.0442  0.0601 *** -0.0031  -0.0139  0.0431  
Protestant 0.2451  -0.0058  0.0880 *** 0.0023  -0.0018  0.0884 *** 
Other religion 0.5944  -0.0158  0.0038  0.0058  -0.0050  0.0046  
Age 0.2550 *** 0.0103  ±  0.0024  0.0032  0.0056 *** 
Age squared -0.0020 *** -0.0001  ±  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
Male 0.5057 *** 0.0203  ±  0.0047  0.0064  0.0111  
White 0.5613 *** -0.1590 *** ±  0.0055  -0.0499 *** -0.0444 *** 
Years of schooling 0.3393 *** 0.0088 *** ±  0.0031  0.0028 *** 0.0059 *** 
Health good/very good 0.5515 *** -0.0033  ±  0.0053  -0.0010  0.0043  
Health excellent 0.8712 *** 0.0202  ±  0.0085  0.0063  0.0148  
Number of hours volunteer 0.0016 *** ±  ±  0.0001  ±  0.0001  
% donate state-age 2.6613 *** ±  ±  0.0254  ±  0.0254  
Medical itemize 0.9647 *** ±  ±  0.0092  ±  0.0092  
Discuss studies ±  0.0363 *** ±  ±  0.0114 *** 0.0114 *** 
Talk news ±  0.0553 **** ±  ±  0.0173 ** 0.0173  
Family eat ±  0.0318 *** ±  ±  0.0100  0.0100  
Chi Squared (25); p value 1,648.56; p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS 3,105 
***, **, *
 denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. 
TABLE 8: Treatment effects ± all parental charitable donations 
PANEL A: Multivariate probit model ATE  T STAT ATET  T STAT ATEUT  T STAT 
         
Parent donates to charity    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C p1 0 1E Y Y Yª º  ¬ ¼     C C p1 0 0E Y Y Yª º  ¬ ¼  
 
0.0214 (0.48)  0.0215 (0.48)  0.0214 (0.48) 
Parent talks to child about donating    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼      C C1 0 1E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼     C C1 0 0E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼  
 0.1344 (2.73)  0.1358 (2.63)  0.1309 (3.06) 
Interaction term    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C p1 0 1, 1E Y Y Y Tª º   ¬ ¼     C C p1 0 0 and/or 0E Y Y Y Tª º   ¬ ¼  
 0.0252 (0.75)   0.0255 (0.75)   0.0248 (0.75) 
PANEL B: 
Multivariate tobit and probit model ATE/AME  T STAT ATET  T STAT ATEUT  T STAT 
 
 
    
Parent donates to charity AME  ±   ±  
 
0.0055 (0.60)       
Parent talks to child about donating    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C1 0 1E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼      C C1 0 0E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼  
 0.2964 (2.65)  0.3187 (2.71)  0.2371 (2.42) 
Interaction term AME       
 0.0033 (1.07)   ±   ±  
TABLE 9: Treatment effects ± parental religious donations 
PANEL A: Multivariate probit model ATE  T STAT ATET  T STAT ATEUT  T STAT 
         
Parent donates to religious charity    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C p1 0 1E Y Y Yª º  ¬ ¼     C C p1 0 0E Y Y Yª º  ¬ ¼  
 
0.0979 (2.04)  0.0986 (1.91)  0.0979 (2.04) 
Parent talks to child about donating    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼      C C1 0 1E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼     C C1 0 0E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼  
 0.1428 (2.87)  0.1428 (2.87)  0.1323 (1.46) 
Interaction term    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C p1 0 1, 1E Y Y Y Tª º   ¬ ¼     C C p1 0 0 and/or 0E Y Y Y Tª º   ¬ ¼  
 -0.0048 (0.13)   -0.0048 (0.13)   -0.0047 (0.13) 
PANEL B: 
Multivariate tobit and probit model ATE/AME  T STAT ATET  T STAT ATEUT  T STAT 
 
 
    
Parent donates to religious charity AME  ±   ±  
 
0.0136 (1.12)       
Parent talks to child about donating    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C1 0 1E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼      C C1 0 0E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼  
 0.2960 (2.44)  0.3178 (2.50)  0.2379 (2.22) 
Interaction term AME       
 0.0019 (0.44)   ±   ±  
TABLE 10: Treatment effects ± parental non-religious donations 
PANEL A: Multivariate probit model ATE  T STAT ATET  T STAT ATEUT  T STAT 
         
Parent donates to non-religious charity    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C p1 0 1E Y Y Yª º  ¬ ¼     C C p1 0 0E Y Y Yª º  ¬ ¼  
 
0.0006 (0.14)  0.0006 (0.14)  0.0006 (0.14) 
Parent talks to child about donating    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼      C C1 0 1E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼     C C1 0 0E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼  
 0.1371 (2.78)  0.1384 (2.67)  0.1337 (3.12) 
Interaction term    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C p1 0 1, 1E Y Y Y Tª º   ¬ ¼     C C p1 0 0 and/or 0E Y Y Y Tª º   ¬ ¼  
 0.0241 (0.72)   0.0241 (0.72)   0.0240 (0.72) 
PANEL B: 
Multivariate tobit and probit model ATE/AME  T STAT ATET  T STAT ATEUT  T STAT 
 
 
    
Parent donates to non-religious charity AME  ±   ±  
 
0.0040 (0.45)       
Parent talks to child about donating    C C1 0E Y Yª º¬ ¼     C C1 0 1E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼      C C1 0 0E Y Y Tª º  ¬ ¼  
 0.3072 (2.77)  0.3307 (2.84)  0.2447 (2.52) 
Interaction term AME       
 0.0032 (0.99)   ±   ±  
 
 
